Conclusion

AI-native organizations do not merely add AI tools to existing structures. They distribute cognition, decision preparation, execution, governance support, and learning across humans and AI agents. This makes organization a constitutional problem. The issue is how mixed actors can act with authority, accountability, observability, adaptability, and continuity.

This paper develops Constitutional Organizational Architecture as a theory of that problem. It argues that adaptive enterprises require enduring but revisable constitutional foundations, traceable authority provenance, accountable delegation, bounded autonomy, differentiated human-AI roles, representational correspondence, governance observability, dynamic topology, constitutional continuity, constitutional adaptability, and resilience and repair. Adaptability and constitutional continuity are not opposites. Continuity supplies the commitments that make adaptation legitimate, while constitutional evolution supplies the pathways through which those commitments can be revised.

The paper's most defensible claim is not that constitutional organizational architecture guarantees performance. It does not. The claim is that as AI agents become organizational participants, theories of organization must explain how authority, accountability, representation, adaptation, and repair are constituted. Constitutional organizational architecture offers one such theoretical model and a research agenda for testing, refining, and bounding it.

PAPER-007J Complete Figure Production Library

PAPER-007J produced the complete 21-figure library. The journal-facing main-text sequence uses six figures; retained appendix, supplement, conference, website, and presentation variants remain available through this complete production library.